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1 Introduction
In countries such as the UK and the US, where there exists no well-established path
from school to work, policies designed to help non-college-bound school-leavers into the
labour market are high up the policy agenda.1 Although school-to-work policies com-
prise a diverse mix of ideas and proposals, the common denominator is an emphasis on
workplace training as a means of smoothing the transition from school to work.2 Pro-
ponents of these policies subscribe to the widely-held view that education and training
(particularly of non-college bound youth) is central to economic performance, but also
draw on recent ﬁndings casting doubt on the eﬃcacy of publicly provided training and
education programs (see, for example, Heckman (1999)). In both of these respects, the
basic thrust of the workplace training idea is very much in step with the conventional
policy wisdom.
In other respects however, the idea of workplace training for school-leavers goes
against the grain of modern thinking about the labour market. In particular, whilst
it was thought in the 1980s that high rates of job mobility amongst school-leavers were
in some sense problematic, inﬂuential research in the 1990s has emphasised the impor-
tance of the role played by the labour market in sorting young workers into the ﬁrms
and the occupations in which they are most productive (Topel and Ward (1992), Neal
(1999)). In this context, workplace training may restrict school-leaver’s job shopping
opportunities by tying them to ﬁrms and occupations that they may not be well suited
1 See Ryan (2001) for a cross-country survey of the school-to-work transition.
2 For the US, see Hughes, Bailey, and Mechur (2001) for a positive assessment of
existing policies, Bassi and Ludwig (2000) for a detailed account of several school-to-
work schemes and Krueger and Rouse (1998) for an analysis of a workplace training
scheme aimed at a wider age group. For the UK, Steedman, Green, and Ryan (1998)
propose a radical extension of the UK’s relatively small ‘Modern Apprenticeship’ scheme.
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to. As Neal (1999) puts it, “institutions that limit returns from search may lead to...an
ineﬃcient assignment of workers to tasks in the economy” (p. 257).
Is workplace training for school-leavers a good or a bad thing? It is instructive to
start from the social planner’s perspective. Workplace training is good to the extent
that it improves productivity within a particular ﬁrm or occupation, but bad in that it
is costly to provide, and because it introduces costs to productive job-shopping. That is,
the prospect of losing ﬁrm- or occupation-speciﬁc capital prevents young workers from
shopping for their most productive match. Clearly, this depends on the training being
‘speciﬁc’. The more transferable is the training provided, the less costly it is to shop for
new jobs and occupations.
To analyse the problem more formally, we consider workplace training as training
within an occupation. However, we consider the transferability of this training to other
occupations to be a choice variable, and we assume that more transferable training is
more costly to provide than less transferable training. Starting from the social planner’s
perspective, we analyse the dependence of both optimal training levels and optimal trans-
ferability on returns to training and the importance of matching (and therefore expected
turnover). Under the assumption that there are a large number of ﬁrms competing to
provide training and recruit trained workers within every occupation, we demonstrate
that the privately optimal training programme exactly mirrors the socially optimal one.
In principle therefore, we would expect the ‘optimal’ workplace training programme to
be oﬀered to school-leavers.
Since our model is concerned with occupational matching, it is related to the litera-
ture that considers this issue in more depth. This includes Miller (1984), McCall (1990)
and Neal (1999). In contrast to these papers, the occupational mobility decision is very
simple in our model: after ﬁnishing training, workers have complete information regard-
ing occupational matches and therefore move when match improvements oﬀset human
capital losses. We maintain this simple assumption in order that we can investigate the
human capital investment decision.
The eﬀect of future turnover on the human capital investment decision has previously
been analysed in the context of ﬁrm matching but not occupation matching. In partic-
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ular, Stevens (1994), Chang and Wang (1996) and Scoones (2000) explore the ﬁrm’s
human capital investment decision when there is matching of ﬁrms to workers, or at
least some turnover. The essential diﬀerences between these models and ours are ﬁrst,
that we deal with occupational turnover and secondly, that since we assume ‘competi-
tive’ occupations, ﬁrms earn no rents, there are no externalities and the privately optimal
training decision mirrors the socially optimal one.
To bridge the gap between theory and practise, the second part of the paper consid-
ers an existing workplace training programme that broadly corresponds to the situation
outlined. German Apprenticeship Training (GAT) is a mass workplace training pro-
gram regularly completed by more than two-thirds of German school-leavers. Training
typically lasts for three years, is organised along occupation lines, and competition for
potential apprentices and newly apprenticed workers is stiﬀ.
Interestingly, many advocates of workplace training in the UK and US regard German
Apprenticeship Training (GAT) as a blueprint or model for school-to-work policies. For
example, with reference to GAT, Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1992) advocate the subsidy
and regulation (via skill standards and certiﬁcation) of workplace training for non-college-
bound US youth. Others however, are more cautious, advocating only that “work-based
learning, as instituted in the Germany style...is an idea worth trying out on a small
scale” (Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994), p.141).
An exchange of views about GAT between these authors goes to the heart of the
workplace training debate.3 Burtless (1994) argues that GAT is to be admired because,
inter alia, the returns to training seem high. Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994)
counter ﬁrst, that the returns are up for debate and secondly, that even if the returns
to training within the training occupation are high, the occupation ‘speciﬁcity’ of the
training may prevent future occupation shopping: “the very narrow technical training
and rigid curriculum of the apprenticeship program may contribute to diminished options
in later life” (p.99). On the second point, Burtless counters that GAT must be relatively
transferable to facilitate certain types of occupational mobility.4
3 See the comments of Burtless (1994) on Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994) and
the reply of the latter.
4 For example, it is an oft-stated fact within the GAT literature that apprentices
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In our empirical work, we attempt to resolve these issues by estimating the returns to
training within the training occupation and by estimating the transferability of training
to other occupations. The ﬁrst of these exercises entails a comparison of the earnings of
apprentices trained inside their occupation with non-apprentices. The second involves
an analysis of the loss of earnings experienced upon moving out of the training occu-
pation. Our approach therefore combines an analysis of the returns to apprenticeship
training based on an earnings equation written in levels (see Card (1999) for a review)
and an analysis of the eﬀects of displacement on earnings (see for example Neal (1995)
and Dustmann and Meghir (1999)). The diﬀerence between our approach and the one
typically taken to estimate the returns to schooling is that we focus only on apprentices
still working within their training occupation. The diﬀerence between our approach and
the displacement literature is that we focus on displacement from an occupation rather
than a ﬁrm or industry.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd returns to GAT within the occupation trained in
comparable to the returns to a year of schooling typically reported in the literature.
Moreover, we ﬁnd this training to be transferable within a broad occupational group,
such as a 1-digit occupation. Consistent with this ﬁnding, we show that there exists a
high degree of mobility out of the apprenticeship occupation. Also consistent with this
ﬁnding, we show that trained German workers have a higher degree of attachment to
their 1-digit occupation than untrained German workers.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 sets up a model of workplace training
and in section 3 we describe how we plan to estimate the parameters of interest. Section
4 provides an outline of GAT and section 5 describes the data used in later sections.
Section 6 describes the occupational mobility of German apprentices and we estimate
the returns to GAT, and the transferability of GAT in section 7. Section 8 concludes
with some remarks on the policy implications of our ﬁndings.
trained as bakers often work for motor companies such as Ford upon completing appren-
ticeship. Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994) might argue that this was a product of
the fact that the returns to apprenticeship are low, so that there is very little cost to this
type of mobility. Burtless (1994) on the other hand would argue that the costs of this
kind of mobility are low because returns to apprenticeship are high and apprenticeship
training is transferable across occupations.
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2 A Model of Workplace Training
In this section, we present a model of workplace training. The model will enable us to
shed light on the issues raised in the Introduction, and will pave the way for our empirical
analysis. The basic structure of the model is simple, but ﬂexible enough to allow us to
consider both training and matching as sources of productivity and wage growth. The
key feature of our model is the assumption that training is occupational, and that the
transferability of this training is chosen by ﬁrms. Since this concept if training diﬀers
from the conventional approach, we discuss these diﬀerences in the next section.
2.1 Training technology
The existing training literature - both in its theoretical and empirical form - starts
from the hugely inﬂuential distinction made by Becker (1993) between general training
(of equal use to every ﬁrm in a labour market) and speciﬁc training (of use only to
the training ﬁrm). Whilst this serves as a neat way of distinguishing which party is
most likely to bear the costs of training, it does not necessarily provide an accurate
representation of what we often think of as training. For example, it is not clear how the
ability to repair TVs, to program computers, or to write economics papers can be said to
be the combination of general and speciﬁc training. Indeed, Becker himself appreciated
that the general-speciﬁc dichotomy was not a useful classiﬁcation of all types of skills:
“(s)ome training may be useful not in most ﬁrms nor in a single ﬁrm but in a set of ﬁrms
deﬁned by product, type of work, or geographical location” (Becker (1993, p.49)).
Since our interest is in workplace training, we focus on training within an occupation.
We denote the level of this training by H, where H may be measured in years. Moreover,
as we are interested in the transferability of this training to other occupations, we allow
occupational training programs to diﬀer according to the transferability of the training
provided. In the simplest case of two occupations, the transferability of training (denoted
γ) is simply the fraction of training in one occupation that can be transferred to another
occupation. Hence, increased transferability does not improve the worker’s performance
within her current occupation, but does improve her performance in another occupation.
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We adopt a reduced form approach to transferability in the sense that we do not
consider how training becomes more transferable, only that it is costly for ﬁrms to make
it more transferable.5 In particular, we make the following assumptions regarding the
training cost function C(H, γ):
C(0, γ) = 0, CH(H, γ) > 0, Cγ(H, γ) > 0
lim
H−→0
CH(H, γ) = 0; lim
γ−→0
Cγ(H, γ) = 0
The ﬁrst set of assumptions imply that there are no costs if no training is undertaken
(H=0), but that increased training increases costs. They also ensure that the costs of
increased training are rising in the level of transferability. Were this not case, there
would be no costs to making training completely transferable. Hence this assumption
makes the problem both interesting, and realistic. The ﬁnal pair of assumptions ensure
that in equilibrium, the social planner (and it will turn out, private ﬁrms) will provide
positive quantities of training, of which a non-zero proportion will be transferable.
2.2 The model
We assume that a ﬁnite number of tasks can be performed in the economy. In the case of
GAT, these will refer to occupations, hence we use tasks and occupations interchangeably.
We focus attention on the two-occupation case.6 Importantly, we assume that there are
a large number of identical ﬁrms oﬀering jobs within each of these occupations. These
ﬁrms are price-takers in the output market, and we normalise the output price to unity.
5 An example of a technology that would generate this reduced form structure is one in
which ﬁrms can invest in occupational training (H) and training that is speciﬁcally geared
to increasing transferability (X). This training might involve learning about related
occupations and acquiring a deeper understanding of the occupation being trained in.
Supposing that productivity in the training occupation is H and in the other occupation
is XH
1+X
, transferability would then be γ = X
1+X
. When X=0, none of the training is
transferred to the other occupation, whilst increases in X increase the transferability of
training.
6 The n-occupation case can be considered if occupations are assumed to be equally
spaced around a circle representing occupational ‘distance’. This model has the impli-
cation that moves are more common between closely related occupations, but otherwise
generates no new insights.
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This ‘identical ﬁrms’ assumption implies that there is no such thing as ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital, and results in an equilibrium in which workers pay all of the costs of their
training. Of course this identical ﬁrms assumption may not be a reasonable description
of certain occupations. However, as we will see in section 4, apprenticeship occupations
are deﬁned very narrowly. Moreover, we can provide an informal test of this assumption
using the QaC data (described in more detail in section 7 and in the appendix). The
survey asks apprentices how many of the apprenticeship skills are used on the current
job. Comparing those in the training occupation and the training ﬁrm with those in
the training occupation but a diﬀerent training ﬁrm, the results are almost identical.
For the former (latter) group, the responses are very few or none 0.78% (0.95%); few
3.25% (4.31%); some 10.53% (11.04%); many 24.30% (7.34%); and very many 61.14%
(56.36%) based on sample sizes of 893 and 951 respectively. Also consistent with this
assumption is the fact that whilst ﬁrms subsidise training costs in certain occupations,
in many occupations, workers do indeed pay for the training themselves.7 Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998) provide a model designed to explain the phenomenon of cost-sharing
based on the superior information that training ﬁrms have regarding worker ability.
Match assumptions
We assume a continuum of workers who supply labour inelastically. Like the ﬁrms
in this economy, the workers are risk-neutral. The product of worker i in every ﬁrm in
occupations A and B is described in equations (1) and (2):
ΠNOAPPAi = m(qi) + ξAi (1)
ΠNOAPPBi = m(qi) + ξBi (2)
Equations (1) and (2) say that worker product is an additive function of ‘general
ability’ m(qi) and the worker-occupation match ξji, j ∈ {A,B}. General ability is a
function of worker’s innate ability qi, where qi ∈ (q, q) and the worker-occupation match
is assumed to be drawn randomly from a uniform distribution ξji ∼ U(−ε¯2 , ε¯2). The
7 Of course apprentices do not pay the costs of training up front. Instead, they earn
wages lower than the value of their apprenticeship product during the training period.
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advantage of the uniform distribution is that it allows us to characterise the importance
of matching in terms of only one parameter ε¯.
Training
Now consider worker i after she has received training quantity H in occupation A,
where a proportion γ of this training can be transferred to occupation B. This worker
has the following product when working in occupations A and B :
ΠAPPAi = α(qi)H +m(qi) + ξAi (3)
ΠAPPBi = α(qi)Hγ +m(qi) + ξBi (4)
Comparing (1) and (3), worker i apprenticed and working in occupation A is more
productive by α(qi)H than untrained worker i working in occupation A. This is the
value of training - the annual return to training α(qi) multiplied by the years o training
undertaken (H). We assume that the annual return to training is an increasing function
of worker quality: α′(qi) > 0. Comparing (2) and (4), worker i trained in occupation
A and working in occupation B is more productive by γα(qi)H than untrained worker i
working in occupation B.
Timing and information
As is standard in the training literature, we assume that workers exist in the labour
market for two periods: a training period and a working period. Prior to the ﬁrst
period, we assume that workers’ optimal matches are unknown to all parties. After the
ﬁrst period, workers’ optimal matches in both occupations are revealed to trainees and
all ﬁrms. We assume that there is no uncertainty relating to any other aspect of the
economy, and we assume that training levels are both observable and veriﬁable. Under
these assumptions, at the start of the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms within each occupation will
compete for new workers by oﬀering training packages (W,H, γ), where W is the ﬁrst-
period wage, and these packages may depend on observed worker ability qi. At the start
of the second period, after the occupational matches have been revealed, ﬁrms compete
for newly trained workers. From the assumption that there are many ﬁrms within every
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occupation, new apprentices will receive wage oﬀers equal to their marginal product.
Whether they choose to leave the training occupation will then depend whether the
improved match that can be realised by leaving the training occupation will exceed the
loss of skills incurred upon making such a move.
2.3 Social optimum
In this section we consider the economy from the social planner’s perspective. Given our
assumptions, per capita social welfare (SWi) is simply expected per capita output less
the direct costs of training C(H, γ):
SWi = Pi(stay)[α(qi)H + E(ξAi|stay)]
+[1− Pi(stay)][α(qi)Hγ + E(ξBi|leave)]
−C(H, γ)
= α(qi)H + α(qi)H(γ − 1)[1− Pi(stay)]
+{Pi(stay)E(ξAi|stay) + [1− Pi(stay)]E(ξBi|leave)}
−C(H, γ) (5)
The right hand side of this equation consists of four components: the direct value of
training, the expected loss of skills resulting from turnover, the beneﬁts of occupational
matching (which correspond to the second line in equation (5)) and the direct costs
of training. We argue in the Appendix that the third term will be increasing in γ.
This formalises the notion that an increase in transferability can increase the expected
beneﬁts of matching. The social planner now has three choices: for a given worker i she
chooses the optimal quantity of training and the optimal transferability of this training
in the event that this worker is trained. She then decides whether this worker should be
trained. Consider ﬁrst the choice of training levels. We state the results without proof
here. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 If the social optimum exists, then H∗ > 0, γ∗ > 0.
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Proof. See Appendix A
In other words, the equilibrium is characterised by positive levels of training, and a
positive degree of transferability. This result comes about because of our assumptions
regarding the cost function. This allows us to consider the more interesting question of
how changes in the importance of matching (as represented by ε¯) and how changes in
the returns to training (as represented by α(qi)) will aﬀect the optimal mix of training.
Regarding the ﬁrst question, we might expect that an increase in the importance
of matching (increased ε¯) would increase optimal transferability and decrease optimal
training. Indeed, when SWHγ < 0, we can show that this is indeed the case. However,
we can not be sure that SWHγ < 0 since this depends inter alia on CHγ(H, γ).
8 Hence
we can not rule out the possibility that increased ε¯ will result in increases in both H and
γ or decreases in both H and γ. The important point however is that the social planner
takes account of matching when choosing the optimal training programme.
Proposition 2 dH
∗
dα
> 0, dH
∗
dq
> 0
Proof. See Appendix A.
This Proposition says that an increase in the returns to training increase the optimal
level of training. Since we assumed that α′(qi) > 0, more able workers (with higher
(qi)) will receive more training. The eﬀects of increased returns on transferability are
ambiguous, and will depend on SWHγ and our assumption that γ is not a function of
qi. We do not consider this possibility, not least because we do not have enough data to
examine transferability according to ability empirically.
To analyse the optimal number of workers trained, we examine the net per capita
social return to training given optimal levels of H and γ and given worker ability qi.
Proposition 3 Training will be socially optimal for any worker of ability q ≥ q+ where
SW (H∗, γ∗; q+) = 0.
8 See appendix for a more formal discussion
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Proof. See Appendix A.
We use the envelope theorem to show that social welfare at the optimal training levels
is continuously increasing in ability. This implies that all workers above a cut-oﬀ ability
level will be trained whilst all those below this cut-oﬀ ability level will not.
2.4 Private optimum
Since we assume that ﬁrms are able to credibly commit to training packages (W,H, γ),
ﬁrms will maximise proﬁts subject to a constraint that the expected utility of the worker
is at least as high as that oﬀered by another ﬁrm. Competition among ﬁrms ensures that
ﬁrms make zero proﬁts, and so the problem is equivalent to ﬁrms maximising the utility
of young school-leavers subject to a zero proﬁt condition. Since utility of a worker is just
the sum of expected wages over the two periods, the ﬁrm’s problem is:
max
H,γ
Ui(W,H, γ) = Wi + Pi(stay)E[Π
APP
Ai |stay] + Pi(leave)E[ΠAPPBi |leave]
s.t. Wi = −C(H, γ)
We know that second-period wages must equal second-period productivity in this model,
hence this reduces to precisely the problem faced by the social planner in equation (5),
we have therefore proved the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the training package oﬀered by private ﬁrms is identical
to that chosen by the social planner, and an identical number of workers are trained.
2.5 Summary
When ﬁrms compete to oﬀer training packages to workers, they will oﬀer socially optimal
training packages. As such, the training oﬀered will take account of the expected degree
of turnover, and more able workers will be oﬀered more training than less able workers,
since their returns will be higher. In our empirical analysis, we will examine the returns to
GAT within the training occupation and the transferability of GAT across occupations.
The next section outlines how we will identify these parameters.
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3 Empirical Framework
In this section, we describe how we will identify the key parameters of interest: the return
to GAT and the transferability of GAT. Again, we consider only the two-occupation case
(A and B), although our results generalise readily to the n-occupation case. We start
by describing the log-earnings of worker i in occupations A and B. This follows directly
from equations (1), (2) (3) and (4):
lnWNOAPPAi = m(ai) + ξai (1’)
lnWNOAPPBi = m(ai) + ξbi (2’)
lnWAPPAi = α(ai)H +m(ai) + ξai (3’)
lnWAPPBi = α(ai)γH +m(ai) + ξbi (4’)
where A is the training occupation and where ‘NOAPP’ (‘APP’) refers to worker i
without (with) an apprenticeship qualiﬁcation. From our theoretical analysis, we know
that the worker leaves the training occupation when:
(ξB − ξA) > α(qi)H(1− γ) (6)
In other words, when the improved (occupational) match exceeds the cost of transferring
apprenticeship training.
3.1 Relation to the existing literature
We estimate the return to training in a relatively standard fashion (see for example
Lynch (1992)). Whilst we show that the presence of matching has implications for our
estimates, we are able to derive an approximate lower bound to this return. Control-
ling for the presence of matching to identify transferability (a function of the costs of
transferring training across occupations) is more diﬃcult. Intuitively, workers leave the
apprenticeship occupation to realise a better match (equation (6)). Hence estimates
based on a comparison of movers and stayers are likely to overstate the transferability
of training.
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The approach that we take - we use a sample of displaced workers to generate what
are eﬀectively ‘exogenous’ occupation changes - is similar to that taken by other papers
that attempt to control for match-driven mobility. For example, Dustmann and Meghir
(1999) focus on the returns to tenure and experience in the context of a model in which
wages are also driven by worker-ﬁrm matching.9 As in our framework, the job change
decision trades oﬀ match improvements with losses of human capital (ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital in their case) and a sample of displaced workers is used to generate ‘exogenous’
ﬁrm changes.10
The empirical paper closest to ours is Werwatz (1998). Werwatz also addresses the
question of how transferable is GAT between occupations, ﬁnding that occupational
‘movers’ earn similar wages to occupational ‘stayers’, and concluding that GAT must
be fairly transferable across occupations. Since Werwatz has only cross-sectional data,
he controls for endogenous mobility by estimating a switching regression model. The
fact that the selection terms are rarely found to be statistically signiﬁcant could indicate
that selection biases are not a problem for his results. However, it is more likely that
the selection equation has been inadequately speciﬁed. In particular, it is not clear that
a variety of ‘quality of work’ measures (such as standing up at work) capture what is
driving occupational mobility (the search for better occupational matches) or that these
do not belong in the earnings equation. Fortunately, the panel nature of the IAB data
enables us to improve upon this strategy. The following subsections describe how we do
this.
9 In fact the model is more general, as the returns to tenure are allowed to vary across
ﬁrms and individuals, and the returns to experience across individuals.
10 Returns to experience are estimated using a sample of workers starting a new job,
and these estimates are used to calculate the within-ﬁrm wage growth which must be due
to a combination of tenure and changes in match quality. Here, the selection problems
are that workers observed working for a particular ﬁrm chose to join this ﬁrm and chose
not to leave it. A sample of ﬁrm closures is used to control for the ﬁrst problem and age
is used as an instrument for tenure.
13
3.2 The returns to apprenticeship training
We estimate the returns to apprenticeship training under two assumptions: ﬁrst, that
school-leavers do not diﬀer in ability and secondly that school-leavers do diﬀer in ability.
Homogenous school-leaver quality
The ﬁrst of these assumptions implies that qi = q for all i, so that m(qi) = m0,
α(qi) = α and H(qi) = H, so that the return to one year’s worth of workplace training
(α) is a homogenous parameter. Suppose that we wish to estimate this parameter. We
do this by estimating the total value of workplace training (αH) and then dividing by the
average number of years spent in apprenticeship training H (which we can measure from
the data). Consider estimating by ordinary least squares an equation of the following
form (ignoring covariates such as experience that have ‘common eﬀects’):
lnW = a0 + a1APPIN + η (7)
where APPIN refers to an apprentice working inside of the training occupation, η is
a random disturbance term and the base group are those without any apprenticeship
training. Then from (1’), (3’) and (6), the probability limits of â0 and â1 are given by:
p lim â0 = m0 + E(ξa|ξa − ξb > 0)
p lim â1 = {m0 + αH + E(ξa|ξa − ξb ≥ −αH[1− γ])}
−{m0 + E(ξa|ξa − ξb > 0)}
= αH + E(ξa|ξa − ξb ≥ −αH[1− γ])− E(ξa|ξa − ξb > 0)
≤ αH
since αH[1− γ] ≥ 0. Hence, using the estimated value of a1 from (7), we will estimate a
lower bound to αH and therefore a lower bound to α.
Heterogeneous school-leaver quality
It is perhaps more plausible to assume that school-leavers diﬀer in ability qi. Hence as
assumed in section 2, α is an increasing functions of qi, H is an increasing function of qi,
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and α is a heterogeneous parameter. Under this assumption, estimates of α(qi) based on
equation (7) represent lower bounds on the returns to intensive apprenticeship training
for those choosing to become apprentices. Since we have shown in proposition 3 that only
those school-leavers with q > q+ will actually be apprenticed, it should be obvious that
this is neither the population mean return to apprenticeship nor the return for those on
the margins of apprenticeship and non-apprenticeship (i.e. those with q 	 q+). Since we
are often concerned with the eﬀects of apprenticeship-type programs on hard-to-educate
workers in other countries, this latter parameter may be of particular interest.
We provide an estimate of this parameter using data disaggregated by training ﬁrm
size. It is often asserted that there is a clear ranking in both the quality of apprenticeship
programs oﬀered and the ability of applicants. Consistent with our model, apprentice-
ship programs tend to last up to one year longer than those oﬀered in smaller ﬁrms
(as we will see in section 4). Moreover, as Steedman (1993) notes, “In the public mind
in Germany, a deﬁnite and complex ranking of apprenticeship places exists linked to
expected lifetime returns. As a general rule, Industrie apprenticeships are more highly
sought-after than Handwerk apprenticeships” (p.1285). In fact, Industrie and Handw-
erk broadly correspond to large and small ﬁrms respectively, and Steedman’s claim is
supported by evidence presented in Harhoﬀ and Kane (1993), who ﬁnd that the propor-
tion of apprentices reporting good mathematics and good German scores in school are
strongly increasing functions of apprenticeship ﬁrm size.
Since we have data on ﬁrm size, we can disaggregate the apprenticeship variable in
equation (7) and use estimates of the returns to those trained in the smallest ﬁrms as an
approximation to α(q+), the return to apprenticeship training to those workers of lowest
ability.11
11 In the model, there is no heterogeneity among ﬁrms and so we oﬀer no formal
explanation as to why the highest quality school-leavers train in the largest ﬁrms (as
opposed to a situation in which every ﬁrm oﬀers a range of programs to cater for diﬀerent
abilities). One possibility is that if training in large ﬁrms generates complementary ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills, the returns to these skills will be shared between trainee and ﬁrm, hence
the expected lifetime utility of apprentices is higher in larger ﬁrms and larger ﬁrms earn
higher rents on higher quality workers. Of course this assumes a ﬁxed number of large
ﬁrms.
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3.3 The transferability of apprenticeship training
In order to investigate the worst-case scenario, we would like to identify a lower bound
to transferability. Since we will estimate transferability by considering the costs of leav-
ing the apprenticeship occupation, this corresponds to an upper bound to the costs of
transferring apprenticeship skills.12 It should be clear that we will not estimate such a
bound by simply examining changes in log earnings between periods t-1 and t. Since
we know from equation (6) that workers will only move out of the training occupation
when ξBi−ξAi> αH (1 − γ), simply comparing the wages of ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ would
cause us to under-estimate the costs of transferring training.
We can, however, make some progress by basing this comparison on a sample of work-
ers displaced for exogenous reasons (e.g. plant closure). To see this, consider estimating
the following equation, where ‘MOVOUT’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the
worker has left the training occupation:
∆ lnW = b0 + b1MOVOUT + η (8)
Then we can estimate an upper bound to the costs of transferring training (lower bound
to transferability) under the following assumption:
A1 Workers are randomly displaced from their ﬁrms. These workers accept the ﬁrst job
that they are oﬀered and may decide to search for a more suitable position on the job.
In a formal model of search with oﬀers arriving exogenously on and oﬀ the job,
assumption A1 requires that the arrival rate of oﬀers to unemployed workers is no greater
than the arrival rate to workers in a job and that search costs for unemployed workers
are at least as large as those employed workers.13 For workers accepting an oﬀer within
12 An upper bound to transferability (lower bound to the costs of transferring training)
is easily derived by augmenting equation (7) to include a dummy for being an apprentice
outside of the training occupation. A lower bound to the cost of transferring training
then corresponds to the diﬀerence between the estimated coeﬃcient on this dummy and
α̂1.
13 See for example Mortensen (1986).
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their training occupation, the expected change in log earnings is then zero. For those
accepting a job outside of the training occupation, the change in log earnings is from
equations (3’), (4’) and (6):
E(∆ lnW |MOV OUTi) = αH(γ − 1) + E(ξB|ξA − ξB ≥ αH(γ − 1))
−E(ξA|ξA − ξB ≥ αH(γ − 1))
= αH(γ − 1) + E(ξB|ξB − ξA < αH(1− γ))
−E(ξA|ξA − ξB ≥ αH(γ − 1))
< αH(γ − 1)
Hence we have that:
p lim b̂1 = {αH(γ − 1) + E(ξB|ξA − ξB ≥ αH(γ − 1))
−E(ξA|ξA − ξB ≥ αH(γ − 1))} − {0}
< αH(γ − 1)
This implies that estimates of b1 derived from equation (8) for a sample of displaced
workers are downward-biased under assumption A1 so that we over-estimate the costs of
transferring skills and so underestimate transferability. This can be explained as follows:
the initial occupation was chosen in period (t-1 ) and the new occupation was not chosen
in period (t-1 ). Hence the expected value of the match in the former is positive, the
expected match in the latter negative and so a move outside of the training occupation
entails an expected loss of match productivity as well as the cost of transferring skills.
This result may not hold under a less restrictive assumption regarding the job-search
behaviour of displaced workers. A more plausible assumption is A2:
A2 There is some cost U to rejecting an oﬀer from outside the training occupation.
This represents the expected cost of remaining unemployed and waiting for an oﬀer from
inside the training occupation.
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Then, displaced workers will only accept an oﬀer from outside of the training occupa-
tion when ξBi−ξAi> αH (1 − γ)− U , so that behaviour will only mirror that under A1
for those workers with large U (in other words, when there is no option but to move).
Under this more general assumption, an obvious strategy is to ﬁnd proxies for U that
will enable us to instrument the decision to leave the training occupation. These in-
strumental variables estimates could then be interpreted as if they were derived under
assumption A1. Another option is to use the answers to a survey question regarding the
usefulness of skills learned during the apprenticeship that we interpret as abstracting
from any matching considerations. We discuss both of these strategies in section 7.
4 German Apprenticeship Training
To understand the structure of GAT, we begin by outlining the 1969 Vocational Training
Act, which remains the foundation stone of GAT. This Act explicitly deﬁned a number
of occupations in which school-leavers could apprentice. Whilst these currently number
375, fewer than the 600 that could be apprenticed in the 1970s, they are deﬁned very
narrowly. For example, within the class of electrical occupations (a two-digit category)
school-leavers can apprentice in 15 diﬀerent occupations.14 This provides a rationale
for our assumption that the skills acquired by apprentices are occupation- rather than
ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
Although the length of apprenticeship depends on the apprenticeship occupation,
GAT typically lasts between two and three and a half years. A crucial part of the cur-
riculum for every training occupation involves training ﬁrms releasing their apprentices
for one day per week to attend a local vocational school. These are organized around
one of ﬁve vocational ﬁelds (industry, commerce, home management, agriculture and
other occupations) and are designed to ﬁll any gaps in general education and to prepare
apprentices for the ﬁnal examination (see Steedman, Green, Betrand, Richter, Rubin,
14 These include occupations such as ‘electronic specialist, telecommunications’; ‘elec-
tronic specialist, communications (telecommunication systems)’; ‘electronic specialist,
communications (information systems)’ and ‘electronic specialist, communications (ra-
dio engineering)’. See Federal Ministry of Education and Science (1992) for more details.
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and Weber (1997) for an example of such a curriculum). Training is completed when
apprentices pass the ﬁnal examinations. These typically consist of several written exam-
inations in the subjects laid down by the training regulations, with many including an
oral or practical component.
It has sometimes been suggested that the centralised German wage bargaining struc-
ture limits the degree of post- and pre-apprenticeship competition among ﬁrms. In fact
though, the wages bargained centrally are more like minimum wages, with ﬁrms free to
increase wages above these minimum levels. In any case, ﬁrms can increase wages by
changing the job titles of workers and in the case of apprenticeships, by oﬀering diﬀerent
fringe beneﬁts. Casey (1991) reports evidence of this practise.
5 Data Issues
For our estimates of returns to and transferability of apprenticeship we use data from a
1% sample of German social security records (see the IAB Data Appendix for a fuller
description of the data set). The data are available for the years 1975-1995, and are
supplemented by data on the ﬁrms to which workers are attached. Due to a change in
the notifying procedure, we use wage information from 1984 onwards. The data are well
suited to the task at hand, since the wage information and timing of employment spells
is very accurate.
5.1 The sample
Only German males are retained for analysis, and our sample consists of two groups:
apprentices and non-apprentices. In order to exclude those engaged in short training
spells, internships and the like, apprentices are deﬁned as those having been observed
training for greater than 450 days. We further restrict the sample of apprentices to those
without the Abitur (usually completed by those that will eventually attend University)
and those starting their apprenticeship aged 19 or under. The age restriction is designed
to include those that take their military service after leaving school, but exclude those
training after a spell in the labour market. We exclude those with an Abitur as the
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labour market for apprentices with this qualiﬁcation will be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to
that for those without an Abitur. In any case, this group is relatively small.15 To make
the sample of non-apprentices as comparable as possible, we include only those whose
ﬁrst spell is observed aged 19 or under and who do not have the Abitur.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics for our sample. The most noticeable
feature of the Table is the gradual ageing of the sample. Since the maximum age for
a person in the sample increases from 19 in 1975 to 39 in 1995, this is to be expected.
Note also that the proportion of workers in the sample with apprenticeship training is
increasing over the observation window. This reﬂects an increase in the proportions
of young school-leavers undertaking apprenticeship training over this period. Due to
the fact that the sample is relatively young, we do not observe many apprentices with
the Meister certiﬁcate (an advanced vocational qualiﬁcation typically undertaken by
apprentices with several years of labour market experience).
5.2 Displacement
A key part of our empirical strategy involves the construction of a sample of ‘exogenously’
displaced workers. In this respect, the fact that plants are given a unique identiﬁer in
the IAB data helps, although we cannot assume that the disappearance from the data
of a plant identiﬁer implies that a plant has closed. This can happen for a variety of
reasons, including closure, takeover or a merger. To deal with this problem, we construct
three subsamples of ‘separations’:
‘Displaced’ First, we use a sample of workers who experience an unemployment spell
after separation. We further restrict this unemployment spell to be greater than one
month to avoid including those workers that quit their previous ﬁrm and exclude workers
with unemployment spells of greater than one year to avoid problems regarding the
scarring eﬀects of unemployment. Although this upper limit is somewhat arbitrary,
experiments suggest that it does not impact much on our results. Whilst this sample
15 This group makes up less than 20% of all apprentices according to the authors’
calculations with the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
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does not enable us to disentangle those workers displaced exogenously and those displaced
for ‘cause’, displacements for cause are only a problem in equation (8) when they are
based on unobserved and transitory components of earnings which are correlated with the
decision to move out of the training occupation. Hence results based on this subsample
are robust to dismissals for cause based on permanent components of earnings (observed
or unobserved).
‘Close’ We can compare our results using the ‘displaced’ subsample to those obtained
by further restricting this sample to those workers who separated, experienced an unem-
ployment spell and whose plant identiﬁer disappeared from the data. If we assume that
plants that merge or reorganise lay workers oﬀ on a ‘last-in-ﬁrst-out’ basis, this group
will contain a higher proportion of workers displaced for exogenous reasons. Since we do
not know the exact date at which the plant closed in the IAB data, we generate two sam-
ples of workers displaced because of ‘closure’: those whose plant identiﬁer disappeared
within one and two years of the separation date (‘close1’ and ‘close2’ respectively).
‘Quits’ Finally, for the purpose of comparison, we present the results for a sample of
workers separating ﬁrms but not experiencing an intervening spell of unemployment.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the four diﬀerent groups. Focusing on
the pre-displacement characteristics, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these groups.
In the second and third rows, we see that displaced workers are slightly younger than
the other groups, although there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the ‘quits’ and
the ‘close’ samples. The most marked diﬀerences occur with respect to pre-displacement
tenure. The ﬁnding that this is lowest amongst the ‘displaced’ workers is consistent
with a layoﬀ policy of ‘last-in-ﬁrst-out’. This is very important in Germany (see Bender,
Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir (1999) for details) and may also explain the diﬀerences
between the ‘close’ and ‘quit’ samples, since those ‘close’ workers that were displaced
prior to the actual closure of the plant will also have been subject to the ‘last-in-ﬁrst-
out’ rule. Pre-separation wages reﬂect these diﬀerences, and it is interesting to note
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that in a regression of pre-displacement wages on pre-displacement characteristics and
dummy variables representing the groups ‘displaced’, ‘close2’ and ‘close1’, the estimated
co-eﬃcients (standard errors) on these variables were -0.00374 (0.00616) for displaced
workers, and -0.0234 (0.0267) and -0.0251 (0.0438) for ‘close2’ and ‘close1’ respectively.
Hence, controlling for pre-displacement characteristics, we can not reject the hypothesis
that these workers represent a random sample of pre-displaced workers.
6 Occupational Mobility
Before analysing the returns to and transferability of GAT, we provide a brief overview of
the occupational mobility of German apprentices. To assess the mobility of apprentices
out of their training occupations, Figure 1 plots Kaplan-Meier estimates of the nonpara-
metric survival functions of post-apprenticeship spells in the 3-digit training occupation.
That the probability decreases sharply upon completion of apprenticeship training im-
plies that a signiﬁcant proportion of apprentices leave the apprenticeship occupation
immediately. Although the hazard decreases at a much slower rate after this point, it
remains the case that after 20 years in the labour market, 75% of apprentices have left
the training occupation at the 3-digit level. The graph for the probability of leaving the
1-digit occupation shows a similar pattern but a slightly higher proportion of workers
remaining within the 1-digit occupation (about 35%). This implies that two-thirds of
German apprentices eventually leave the apprenticeship occupation at the 1-digit level.
To compare this with the mobility of non-apprentices, Table 3 presents occupation
and ﬁrm mobility statistics for apprentices and comparable non-apprentices for the years
1985, 1991 and 1995. For non-apprentices, we use the ﬁrst occupation/ﬁrm worked in
upon labour market entry in place of the apprenticeship occupation/ﬁrm. For appren-
tices, Table 3 shows that in 1995, 60% have left their apprenticeship occupation with the
highest mobility taking place at the 1-digit level. For non-apprentices however, the ﬁgure
is 80%. Using mobility from the training industry rather than the training occupation
produces a similar pattern: large number of apprentices leave the apprenticeship indus-
try, but even larger numbers of non-apprentices leave the ﬁrst industry worked in. This
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would suggest that there is some speciﬁcity in the apprenticeship training investment
that deters apprentices from switching occupation/industry. In contrast, the diﬀerences
in ﬁrm mobility between apprentices and non-apprentices are far less pronounced. This
adds weight to our assumption that apprenticeship training is occupation- rather than
ﬁrm-based.
7 Estimates of Returns and Transferability
Our objective in this section is to estimate an approximate lower bound to the return
to apprenticeship training within the training occupation α(q+) and an upper bound to
the costs of transferring training.
7.1 Returns to apprenticeship
In order to obtain our approximate lower bound to the return to apprenticeship (α), we
begin by assuming that this value does not depend on school-leaver ability a, and simply
split apprentices according to whether they are working inside or outside the training
occupation. From the top panel of Table 4, we see that estimates of αH based on equa-
tion (7) are approximately 0.15. With the conservative assumption that apprenticeship
training lasts for an average of 2.75 years, and that an average of two-thirds of the ap-
prenticeship is spent training, this gives an annualised average return of approximately
8.2%. This is comparable to estimates of the rate of return to schooling found in the
literature. For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991), using US Census data, ﬁnd esti-
mates of the rate of return between 5% and 7% when estimating by OLS, and between
6% and 10% when estimating by IV.16 Our estimates of the return to additional years
16 For the purposes of comparing our results with the previous literature, the second
panel of Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (7), in which we pool the
two types of apprentice (those working inside and outside the training occupation) to
estimate the ‘return to apprenticeship training’ as commonly reported. This co-eﬃcient
averages roughly 0.19 over the sample period. Based on a similar speciﬁcation, Winkel-
mann (1994), using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), obtains co-eﬃcients
that average approximately 0.2 over the period 1985-1990. Werwatz (1998), using the
Qualiﬁcations and Careers (QaC) data, obtains a co-eﬃcient for 1985 of 0.137. That this
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of experience is large, although this is likely to reﬂect the fact that we observe these
workers over their ﬁrst few years in the labour market, when much of the information
regarding occupational match productivity is revealed. The low returns to tenure are
consistent with those reported in Dustmann and Meghir (1999).
As noted in section 3, the value of apprenticeship is likely to depend on worker ability
q. To obtain our approximate lower bound to the return to apprenticeship α(q+), we
split the group of apprentices according to the size of their training ﬁrm. As a check that
apprenticeship ﬁrm size proxies school-leaver quality, the ﬁrst column of Table 5 presents
self-reported school test scores (Harhoﬀ and Kane (1997)). As commonly assumed in the
GAT literature, we see a clear correlation between training ﬁrm size and school-leaver
ability, although the group with the lowest scores are actually those trained in the second
smallest ﬁrm size. The second column calculates the proportion of apprentices trained
in ﬁrms of this size, whilst the third column reports the co-eﬃcients estimated from a
version of equation (7) in which the apprenticeship variable is disaggregated according
to ﬁrm size, and we pool across years (and include year dummies). To obtain estimates
of the rate of return to an additional year of training, we again adjust these co-eﬃcients
according to the length of the training program (again assumed to be 2.75 years for each
ﬁrm size group) and the average time spent training (column 5).
Rates of return across the diﬀerent size groups are again in the broad range of es-
timates of the return to an additional year of schooling. Taking the return to one year
of apprenticeship training for those workers trained in ﬁrms with between two and nine
employees as the return to those on the margins of apprenticeship and work, this re-
turn is approximately 5.87%. As we would expect, this is lower than the return found
for higher ability school-leavers training in larger ﬁrms, but it is still within the broad
range of estimates of the rate of return to schooling. Moreover, each of these estimates
represent lower bounds on the true returns to apprenticeship training. We now attempt
to estimate the transferability of this training.
is slightly lower than our estimate may be attributable to the fact that Werwatz (1998)
includes additional covariates (such as industry dummies) in his earnings equation.
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7.2 Transferability
We now turn our attention to the transferability of apprenticeship training between
occupations, and in Table 6, we present estimates of the costs of transferring training
obtained from estimating equation (8). Before turning to the results for the groups
of ‘displaced’ workers that we are interested in, we begin with our comparison group
of ‘quits’. Looking at the left-hand column of the Table, we see that amongst the
group of quits, the wage penalty associated with moving out of the training occupation
is very close to zero. Whilst this would suggest that training is entirely transferable,
these estimates are obviously biased because of the match-driven nature of this mobility.
Turning then to column 2, we ﬁnd that for displaced workers, the point estimate of the
wage penalty is now negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests that there
are some costs to transferring occupations, although since these are small in comparison
to the total value of apprenticeship training inside the occupation (αH =0.15 from
Table 4), this suggests that transferability is high. Moreover, in the ﬁnal two columns,
our estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The ﬁnding of only very small wage penalties associated with leaving the training
occupation might suggest that training is transferable. However, it may be that train-
ing is more transferable between closely related occupations than between occupations
which are a greater occupational ‘distance’ apart. To investigate this possibility, we
disaggregate moves out of the training occupation and consider the wage penalties asso-
ciated with diﬀerent kinds of moves. We begin by measuring distance according to the
occupational codes. That is, we say that a move at only the three-digit level is a move
into an occupation more closely related to the training occupation than one involving
a move at the two-digit level. The penalties to moving out of the training occupation
according to the distance moved are presented in the second panel of Table 6. Looking
ﬁrst at the left-hand column, for the quits, only the wage penalty associated with a move
out of the training occupation at the 1-digit level is negative, although it is very small.
Again, since the majority of these moves are selective, we would not expect to ﬁnd large
penalties to moving for this group.
For displaced workers, the wage penalty associated with moving out of the training
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occupation at the 1-digit level is slightly larger, and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. How-
ever, it is still small when compared with estimates of the total value of apprenticeship
training within the occupation (0.15 from Table 4), hence transferability is still high.
Amongst the ‘close’ samples, these estimates are also negative. For those leaving a plant
that closed down within one year, the point estimate is larger in absolute value and
approximately two-thirds of the value of apprenticeship training. Taking this estimate
as the worst-case scenario suggests that whilst training is completely transferable within
a 1-digit occupation, only one-third of the training can be transferred outside of the
1-digit occupation.
Since these codes may not be an adequate measure of occupational distance, we look
in a next step only at moves out of the training occupation that also involve changes
in industry at the two-digit level (the classiﬁcation is produced in Table A1). The idea
here is that reported changes in occupation are less likely to be spurious if they are
also accompanied by changes in reported industry. Looking at the third panel of Table
6, we ﬁnd a similar set of results, with the exception that amongst the ‘close’ sample
there is some evidence of wage penalties incurred for moves at the 2-digit level. Like
most of the estimates relating to movements at the three- and two-digit level, these
estimates are very unstable and often imprecisely estimated. This reﬂects the small cell
sizes associated with these movements (as seen in Table 3).
7.3 Results from a question regarding skill use
It was observed in section 3.3 that if apprentices select the new occupation by trading oﬀ
improved match values with the costs of transferring skills (as opposed to accepting the
ﬁrst oﬀer and searching on the job), we may not be estimating an upper bound to the
cost of transferring training. One solution to this problem is to instrument the decision
to move out of the training occupation. Two instruments that we considered were
whether the worker was married (assumed to be correlated with the value of leisure) and
employment levels in the training occupation (assumed correlated with the arrival rate
of oﬀers from within the training occupation when unemployed). Whilst these variables
entered the second-stage regressions with the right sign, they were rarely signiﬁcant and
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so the ﬁrst-stage estimates were extremely unstable.
Hence as an additional check on the robustness of our results regarding transferability,
we use the answers from a question contained in the Qualiﬁcations and Careers Survey
(QaC) data. The survey is cross-sectional, but it asks workers a number of retrospective
questions that enable us to identify the training occupation of the worker (see appendix
for details). In particular, the survey asks workers: “How much of the occupational
knowledge and skills you acquired during apprenticeship can you still apply in your
current work?” The answer can be “very little or nothing at all; a little; some; quite a
lot, a lot”. Since it is hard to see how workers could interpret this as anything other
than a question concerning the actual value of apprenticeship skills in the new job, it
should act as a direct measure of transferability that is not aﬀected by the value of the
match in the new occupation.
Table 7 presents the answers to this question based on a sample of similar workers
(German male apprentices without the Abitur under the age of 35). From the top panel,
we see that overall, almost two-thirds respond that they are using ‘many’ or ‘very many’
of their apprenticeship skills, with the remaining third using ‘some’, ‘few’ or ‘very few
or none at all’. When we split this group into those working inside and outside of
the training occupation, the results are very interesting. Amongst those working inside
their training occupation, almost 85% claim to be using ‘many’ or ‘very many’ of the
skills acquired during apprenticeship. The ﬁgure for those outside of the apprenticeship
occupation is just under 40%. Hence it is clear that apprenticeships are occupational.
But it is interesting to note that even amongst those outside of the training occupation,
only one-quarter claim to be using ‘very few or none’ of their skills.
In Panel B we break the movers down according to the distance moved. The results
are very dramatic. Amongst those that move at a 3-digit level, only 1.4% claim to be
using ‘very few or none’ of their skills, whilst 45.7% claim to be using ‘very many’.
However, for those moving at the 1-digit level, the pattern is exactly reversed, with
30.31% claiming to use ‘very few or none’ and only 16.74% claiming to use ‘very many’.
We ﬁnd a similar pattern of results when interacting occupational moves with switches in
two-digit industry (Panel C). Overall, these skill use results reinforce the results based on
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earnings: apprenticeship training is completely transferable within a broad occupational
group (e.g. a 1-digit occupation), but perhaps only one-third of apprenticeship training
is transferable outside of this group.
8 Conclusions
The paper began by stressing that workplace training has indirect as well as direct
costs: namely, that it can prevent productive job-shopping. However, our model pro-
vided conditions under which ﬁrms will take account of expected future mobility and
provide training that is to some extent transferable. In the empirical part of the paper
we painted a positive picture of GAT. Trainees receive training in an occupation, with
a lower bound to annual returns we estimated around 6%. The training is suﬃciently
transferable to enable them to transfer all of these skills across a wide range of occupa-
tions and in a worst-case scenario, one-third of this skills outside of this group. In line
with these ﬁndings, patterns of occupational mobility suggest mobility from the train-
ing occupation is the norm rather than the exception, although mobility outside of the
1-digit occupational group is lower than that among non-apprentices.
Given the picture we have painted, it would appear that workplace training is a
promising alternative to traditional classroom-based routes to skills. This begs the ques-
tion of why countries such as the UK and US do not have similar programs. Two sources
of market failure suggest themselves. First, it may be that young school-leavers in other
countries do not have the means to ﬁnance this kind of training since, for example, living
in the parents’ home into young adulthood is not the norm. In other words, our assump-
tion that young workers are not credit-constrained and are willing and able to pay for
their own training (via the acceptance of lower wages during training) may need to be
relaxed in other contexts. Another source of market failure is the possibility that train-
ing can not be written into a contract. Then, interesting work by Malcomson, Maw, and
McCormick (2000) shows that there may be a role for the regulation of contract length
to ensure that the period in which workers earn lower wages is suﬃciently long to allow
ﬁrms to recoup training expenses. Only then will they have incentives to train. Since
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German apprenticeship training contracts are regulated in this manner, this presents
an interesting agenda for policy-makers interested in the design of workplace training
programs for non-college-bound youth.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
       
Daily Wage (1995 DM) 102.6 114.1 122.1 131.9 136.6 139.9 
       
Age 23.1 24.2 25.4 26.6 27.9 29.2 
Experience 4.82 5.70 6.74 7.76 8.96 10.17 
Tenure  2.49 2.85 3.21 3.64 4.29 4.79 
       
Apprenticeship 0.772 0.791 0.785 0.798 0.822 0.830 
Meister Qualification .00690 0.0103 0.0141 0.0178 0.0221 0.0242
       
N 23725 28919 34279 37670 37981 38765 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Workers Inside 3-digit Apprenticeship 
Occupation Prior to Separation 
 
 ‘Quits’ ‘Displaced’ ‘Close 2’ ‘Close 1’ 
     
Pre-Separation Tenure 2.26 1.41 1.65 1.87 
Age 24.61 24.34 24.54 24.68 
Experience 5.47 5.23 5.46 5.74 
Pre-Separation Wage 114.82 102.98 105.12 105.34 
     
Average Length of Unemployment 
(Yrs) 
--- 0.296 0.309 0.314 
     
N 14279 4893 408 161 
 
Notes: See text for definitions of ‘Quit’, ‘Displaced’, ‘Close 2’ and ‘Close 1’. Each column is 
based on  sample of workers observed in the apprenticeship occupation pooled across years 1984-
1995. 
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Table 3:Comparison of Occupational Mobility amongst German Apprentices and Non-
Apprentices 
 
 App. Non- 
App. 
App. Non- 
App. 
App. Non- 
App. 
 1985 1985 1991 1991 1995 1995 
       
Proportion  Out of Training/First 
Occupation: 
0.481 0.6853 0.570 0.7825 0.603 0.8067
…at 3-digit Level 0.0516 0.0285 0.0540 0.0262 0.0543 0.0270
…at 2-digit Level 0.0974 0.0921 0.0966 0.0988 0.0950 0.1101
…at 1-digit Level 0.332 0.5647 0.419 0.6575 0.454 0.6696
       
Proportion  Out of 2-digit 
Training/First Industry and  
Training/First Occupation: 
 
0.344 
 
0.5721
 
0.430 
 
0.6742 
 
0.461 
 
0.6925
…at 3-digit Level 0.0255 0.0143 0.0271 0.0140 0.0281 0.0141
…at 2-digit Level 0.0601 0.0683 0.0651 0.0727 0.0666 0.0819
…at 1-digit Level 0.259 0.4895 0.338 0.5876 0.367 0.5965
       
Proportion leaving Training/First Firm 0.633 0.7066 0.714 0.8074 0.753 0.8336
       
Amongst those with Training/First 
Firm: 
      
Proportion  Out of Train./First 
Occupation: 
0.201 0.1894 0.240 0.2459 0.266 0.2758
       
Amongst those left Training/First 
Firm: 
      
Proportion  Out of Train./First 
Occupation: 
0.643 0.8912 0.702 0.9105 0.713 0.9127
       
N 18312 5399 30063 7582 32174 6582 
 
Notes: We impose the same age and education (with the exception of apprenticeship of 
course) as for the apprenticeship sample on selection of the non-apprentices sample. We 
consider only non-apprentices who we do never observe completing an apprenticeship 
(even at a later stage of their work life). 
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Table 4: Returns to Apprenticeship Training 
 
 1985 1987  1989 1991 1993 1995 
 
Panel A: Return to `Intensive’ Apprenticeship Training 
 
Apprenticeship 
Inside 
Occupation 
 
0.122 
 
0.127 
 
0.166 
 
0.144 
 
0.155 
 
0.163 
 
Panel B: Estimates of ‘Standard’ Return to Apprenticeship Training 
 
Experience 0.0958 0.113 0.104 0.119 0.106 0.0988 
Experience2 -0.00263 -0.00468 -0.00370 -0.00443 -0.0037 -0.00325 
Tenure 0.00419 0.009 0.00879 0.0104 0.0124 0.0140 
       
Apprenticeship 0.168 0.167 0.213 0.195 0.189 0.184 
Meister -0.019 0.159 0.152 0.176 0.144 0.155 
       
N 22591 27578 32516 35739 35941 37140 
 
Notes: Estimates in the first panel are based on the same equation as those presented in the first 
panel, with the apprenticeship variable referring only to those with apprenticeship inside the 
occupation worked in. All estimates with the exceptions of those in italics significant at the 1% 
level, where t-ratios based on robust standard errors. 
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Table 5: Returns Broken Down by Training Firm Size 
 
 
 
Notes: Data in the second column from Harhoff and Kane (1993), Table 7. Their table uses an identical 
size breakdown with the two exceptions: in their Table, rows 1 and 2 correspond to firms of size 1-4 
and 4-9 respectively. Secondly, their data aggregates firm sizes 10-49. We assume the figures for sizes 
10-19 and 20-49 are identical. Figures reported in the third and fourth columns are based on data 
pooled over the years 1984 to 1995. The return inside the apprenticeship occupation is derived from an 
equation identical to that used to estimate these returns in Table 4, except that the apprenticeship 
variable is interacted with firm size and year dummies are included (sample size 374,710). All 
estimates significant at the 1% level. Estimates of the proportion of apprenticeship time spent training 
are based on unpublished results from a study on the costs of apprenticeship for firms in West 
Germany in 1991, by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education (BiBB). We thank Ursula Beicht 
of the BiBB for making this information available. Estimates of the rate of return are calculated by 
dividing the estimated coefficient by the average numbers of years spent training and the estimated 
proportion of apprenticeship time spent training (inside or outside of the training firm).  The average 
numbers of years spent training is assumed as 2.75 years. 
 
Training 
Firm size 
Propn with 
good Math. 
scores  
Propn 
trained in 
this size of 
firm 
Return 
Inside 
Training 
Occupation 
Propn of 
Time spent 
Training   
Estimated 
Annual 
Return to 
Training 
      
1 0.110 0.023 0.0726 0.56 4.71% 
2-9 0.107 0.225 0.0904 0.56 5.87% 
10-19 0.136 0.141 0.0900 0.61 5.37% 
20-49 0.136 0.148 0.109 0.61 6.50% 
50-99 0.136 0.089 0.154 0.69 8.12% 
100-499 0.154 0.168 0.202 0.69 10.65% 
500-999 0.160 0.063 0.190 0.81 8.53% 
>1000 0.172 0.144 0.270 0.81 12.12% 
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Table 6: Wage Penalty to Moving Out of the Apprenticeship Occupation 
 
 ‘Quits’ ‘Displaced’ ‘Close 2’ ‘Close 1’ 
 Panel A: Wage Penalty to Leaving the Apprenticeship Occupation 
 --- -0.132*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.107 
(0.111) 
-0.352*** 
(0.0134) 
Change in 
Experience 
0.116*** 
(0.00714) 
0.137*** 
(0.00785) 
0.0899*** 
(0.0288) 
0.174*** 
(0.0552) 
Change in 
Experience2 
-0.00488*** 
(0.000539) 
-0.00691*** 
(0.000622) 
-0.00373** 
(0.00209) 
-0.00579* 
(0.00399) 
Change in Tenure 0.00268*** 
(0.000904) 
0.00787*** 
(0.00323) 
-0.00149 
(0.0114) 
-0.0101 
(0.0175) 
Move Out -0.000552 
(0.00619) 
-0.0165* 
(0.0117) 
0.0300 
(0.0381) 
-0.0349 
(0.061) 
N 14279 4893 408 161 
 Panel B: Wage Penalty to Leaving the Apprenticeship Occupation by 
Distance (measured by Occupational Codes) 
3-digit only 0.000641 
(0.0128) 
0.0208 
(0.0242) 
0.374*** 
(0.122) 
0.360*** 
(0.136) 
2-digit only 0.0484*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0424*** 
(0.0216) 
0.0690* 
(0.0632) 
0.033 
(0.0965) 
1-digit -0.0128** 
(0.00738) 
-0.0352*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0114 
(0.0420) 
-0.103* 
(0.0708) 
 Panel C: Wage Penalty to Leaving the Apprenticeship Occupation 
and Switching 2-digit Industry (occupational distance measured by 
Industrial and Occupational Codes) 
Move Out (All) -0.0199*** 
(0.00730) 
-0.0397*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0239 
(0.0414) 
-0.0619 
(0.0705) 
3-digit only -0.00235 
(0.0196) 
0.00496 
(0.0307) 
0.283*** 
(0.108) 
0.459*** 
(0.132) 
2-digit only 0.0326*** 
(0.0164) 
0.0172 
(0.0263) 
-0.0359 
(0.0738) 
-0.106 
(0.205) 
1-digit  -0.0320*** 
(0.00834) 
-0.0541*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0400 
(0.0449) 
-0.0950* 
(0.0764) 
 
Notes: see text for definitions of ‘Quits’, ‘Displaced’, ‘Close 2’ and ‘Close 1’.  Panel B and C are estimated 
using the same equation as Panel A, with moves out of the apprenticeship occupation disaggregated by distance 
moved. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted *** (**,*). 
 
 36
Table 7: How many Apprenticeship Skills used in the Current Job? 
 
 Very 
Few or 
None 
Few Some Many Very 
Many 
N 
 Panel A: Analysis of Skill Use according to whether 
Working in Apprenticeship Occupation 
All  11.06 9.50 15.01 21.74 42.69 3317 
Working in Training 
Occupation 
0.87 3.80 10.79 25.87 58.68 1844 
Working Out of 
Training 
Occupation 
23.83 16.63 20.30 16.56 22.67 1473 
 
 Panel B: Analysis of Movers according to Distance 
Measured by Codes 
3-digit Level 1.44 10.58 14.42 27.88 45.67 208 
2-digit Level 12.24 12.24 25.00 19.90 30.61 196 
1-digit Level 30.31 18.62 20.58 13.75 16.74 1069 
 Panel C: Analysis of Occupational Switchers and 
Industry Switchers (2-digit level) according to Distance 
Measured by Codes  
All 33.41 20.26 21.14 12.92 12.27 913 
3-digit Level 1.43 24.29 17.14 30.00 27.14 70 
2-digit Level 19.15 17.02 26.60 15.96 21.28 94 
1-digit Level 38.18 20.29 20.83 10.95 9.75 749 
 
Notes: Column headings are answers to question `How much of your occupational 
knowledge and skills, which you have obtained in your apprenticeship, can you actually use 
in your current job?’ from QaC data. See text for details. 
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Table A1: Industry Classification as Used in Empirical Analysis 
 
 Industry Two digit ES-
classification* 
PSID equivalent 
1 Agriculture, Forestry 00-02 17-27 
2 Fishing 03 28 
3 Energy 04 377, 378, 467-479 
4 Mining 05-08 47-57 
5 Chemical 09 347, 357-369 
6 Synthetics 10-13 348, 349, 379-387 
7 Earth/Clay/Stone 14-16 119-138 
8 Iron/Steel 17-21 139-169 
9 Mechanical Engineering 22-32 177-198, 219-238 
10 Electrical Engineering 33-39 199-209, 239-259 
11 Wood/Paper/Printing 40-44 107-118, 328-339 
12 Clothing/Textiles 45-53 307-327, 388-398 
13 Food industry 54-58 268-299 
14 Construction/ Construction related 59-61  
15 Trade 62 507-588, 607-698 
16 Train system 63 407 
17 Postal system 64 447-449, 907 
18 Other transport 65-68 408-429 
19 Financial institutions 69 707-709, 717 
20 Restaurants, Service Industry 70-73 777-809 
21 Education/Sport 74-77 857-869 
22 Health Service 78 828-848 
23 Legal Services 79 718, 849 
24 Other Services 80-86 727-759, 888-897 
25 Non Profit 
(Voluntary/Church/Private 
Households) 
87-90 877-887, 769 
26 Public Institutions (Regional 
Authority/ Social Security) 
91-94 917-937 
 
Notes: Classification in the list of industries used for the statistics of the Federal Employment Service in 
Germany (1973 edition). 
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Figure 1: Probability of Staying in Apprenticeship Occupation 
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A Mathematical Appendix
We begin by deriving expressions for the three components of the social returns described
on the right-hand side of equation (5). The stay/leave choice faced by the newly trained
worker (as described in section 2.2) gives rise to the following expected probability of
leaving:
P (leave) = P (ξA − ξB) > αH(γ − 1))
where we suppress the dependence of α on q. Hence we need to derive the distribution
of D = ξA − ξB. Recall that ξj ∼ U [− ε¯2 , ε¯2 ] where j∈ {A,B} Then it is relatively easy
to show (using a method similar to that in Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974) chapter V)
that:
fD(d) =
 ε¯+dε¯2 if −ε¯ ≤ d < 0ε¯−d
ε¯2
if 0 ≤ d ≤ ε¯
so that D has a triangular density function, and that:
FD(d) =

(d+ε¯)2
2ε¯2
if −ε¯ ≤ d < 0
ε¯2+2ε¯d−d2
2ε¯2
if 0 ≤ d ≤ ε¯
Now we can use this distribution function to derive:
P (stay) = P (d > k) =
ε¯2 − 2ε¯k − k2
2ε¯2
where k = αH(γ − 1). Recall that we assumed that ﬁrms will never provide enough
training to prevent some (expected) turnover. This implies that -ε¯ < k ≤ 0. Intuitively,
when k → −ε¯ (training is not transferable), we have that P (stay) → 1. When k = 0
(transferable training), we have that P (stay) = 1
2
. Turning to expected match values,
we have that:
E(ξA|stay) = E(ξA|d > k)
=
2
(
ε¯3
12
− k3
6
− ε¯k2
4
)
ε¯2 − 2ε¯k − k2
E(ξB|leave) = E(ξB|d < k)
= −k
3
+
ε¯
6
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Hence when k → −ε¯, E(ξA|d > k) → 0 and E(ξB|d < k) → ε¯2 . In other words, when
training is not transferable, the fact that workers stayed in the training occupation tells
us little about their match to that occupation, whereas workers who leave the training
occupation have an excellent match in their new occupation. When k = 0 (transferable
training), we have that E(ξA|d > k) = E(ξB|d < k) = ε¯6 , hence expected matches are
positive and identical for movers and stayers.
We can now substitute all of these expressions into the social returns function (the
right-hand-side of equation (5) without costs) to derive:
SW + C(H, γ) = αH + kP (leave)
+[P (stay)E(ξA|stay) + P (leave)E(ξB|leave)]
= αH + k
(k + ε¯)2
2ε¯2
+
ε¯3
6
− k2ε¯
2
− k3
3
ε¯2
(A1)
Recall that the second term is the loss of skills due to expected turnover. It can be
shown that this loss follows an inverted U shape over the range -ε¯ < k ≤ 0. When k→-ε¯,
there is no loss since there is no turnover. When k=0, there is no loss since training is
general (γ = 1). In between these two values this term is negative. Turning to the third
term - the expected gains from matching - when k = 0, and training is transferable, the
expected gain is ε¯
6
(as already noted). As k decreases (training becomes less transferable),
this term decreases, until it tends to zero as k → −ε¯ and workers become ‘trapped’ in
their training occupation. Finally, in proving the propositions, we will make use of the
following results:
SWk =
d
dk
{
k
(k + ε¯)2
2ε¯2
+
ε¯3
6
− k2ε¯
2
− k3
3
ε¯2
}
=
(k + ε¯)2
2ε¯2
> 0
SWkk =
k + ε¯
ε¯2
> 0
SWkε¯ = −k (k + ε¯)
ε¯3
> 0
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 1.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiating the social welfare function with respect to H and γ we have the ﬁrst-order
conditions for a maximum:
SWH = α + SWk
dk
dH
− CH
= α + SWkα(γ − 1)− CH = 0 (A2)
SWγ = SWkαH − Cγ = 0 (A3)
We ﬁrst show that H = 0 using SWH . Suppose γ ≥ 0. Then k = 0 and SWk = 12
hence α[1 + SWk(γ − 1)] > 0. But given our assumptions regarding the cost function,
CH(0, γ) = 0. Hence a contradiction. Now suppose that γ = 0, H > 0. Then SWk > 0
(since −ε¯ < k = −αH) but again, C(H, 0) = 0 hence a contradiction. QED.
A.2 Matching and optimal training levels
Taking total diﬀerentials of both of the ﬁrst-order conditions, dividing through by dε¯
and rearranging gives:
dH
dε¯
=
−SWHγSWγε¯ + SWHε¯SWγγ
SWγHSWHγ − SWHHSWγγ (A4)
dγ
dε¯
=
SWγε¯SWHH − SWγHSWHε¯
SWγHSWHγ − SWHHSWγγ (A5)
From the second-order conditions for a maximum, the denominator must be negative as
must the terms SWγγ and SWHH . We can also show that:
SWHε¯ = SWkε¯α(γ − 1)
= −k (k + ε¯)
ε¯3
α(γ − 1)
< 0
This says that more (expected) turnover induced by an increase in the importance of
matching reduces the eﬀectiveness of training investments (at given levels of transfer-
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ability). And:
SWγε¯ = SWkε¯αH
= −k (k + ε¯)
ε¯3
αH
> 0
Hence when SWHγ < 0, we have that (
dH
dε¯
< 0, dγ
dε¯
> 0), whereas when SWHγ > 0,
we can not rule out that (dH
dε¯
< 0, dγ
dε¯
< 0) or (dH
dε¯
> 0, dγ
dε¯
> 0). We can however
rule out the case of (dH
dε¯
> 0, dγ
dε¯
< 0) since simple manipulation of the numerators in
(A4) and (A5) show that this will result in a violation of the second-order condition:
SWγHSWHγ − SWHHSWγγ < 0. Note that:
SWHγ = α
(k + ε¯)(3k + ε¯)
2ε¯2
− CHγ
so that the sign of this term will depend inter alia on the properties of the cost function.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that we assume that α = α(q), where α′(q) > 0. Now, taking total diﬀerentials of
both of the ﬁrst-order conditions, dividing through by dα and rearranging gives:
dH
dα
=
−SWHγSWγα + SWHαSWγγ
SWγHSWHγ − SWHHSWγγ
dγ
dα
=
−SWγHSWHα + SWγαSWHH
SWγHSWHγ − SWHHSWγγ
We can show that:
SWHα = 1 + (γ − 1)(SWγH)
= 1 + (γ − 1)
[
(k + ε¯)(3k + ε¯)
2ε¯2
]
> 0
and it is easily shown that SWγH and SWγα must take the same sign. Then, using the
second-order conditions, it must be the case that dH
dα
> 0 whilst the sign of dγ
dα
depends
on SWγH , which we have shown can not be signed. QED.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We can use the envelope theorem to evaluate a change in q on social welfare at optimum
levels of H and γ:
dSW (H, γ)
dq
= H + SWk(γH −H)
= H[1 + (γ − 1)SWk]
= H[1 + (γ − 1)(k + ε¯)
2
2ε¯2
]
> 0
Hence social welfare is a continuous (by inspection of equation (A1)) and increasing
function of q. Hence there must exist a number q+ such that SW (q) > 0 for q > q+ and
SW (q) < 0 otherwise. QED.
B Data Appendix
B.1 IAB data
We use data from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for the years
1975-1995. The basis of the IAB employment subsample is the integrated notifying
procedure for health insurance, statutory pension scheme and unemployment insurance
which is regulated through German legislation. The procedure requires that employers
report all information of their employees registered by the social security system to the
social security agencies. One problem with the data is that prior to 1984, ﬁrms were not
obliged to report extra payments such as Christmas and holiday bonuses. Since these
are an important part of compensation in Germany, all of our earnings equations are
estimated using data from 1984 onwards. Employers have to notify the beginning and
the end of an employment spell and have to give an annual notiﬁcation for each em-
ployee. The employment statistics include all employees obliged to pay social insurance
contributions. The employment statistics do not include, among others, civil servants,
family workers, those in marginal employment, and students enrolled in higher education
(Cramer (1985)). For 1995, the employment statistics cover nearly 79.4% of all employed
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persons in Western Germany (Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000)).
The notiﬁcation provides information on individual characteristics as gender, year of
birth, number of children and qualiﬁcations. Furthermore it reports information on the
employment including information on the occupational code, the occupational status,
the establishment number of the employer with information on the size and the industry
of the employer, and ﬁnally the gross earnings of the employee over the past employment
spell which served as the basis for social security contributions. Importantly, this allows
us to infer the occupation trained in and the size of the training ﬁrm. This information
is passed on from the social insurance agencies to the Federal Employment Services and
collected in the so called historic ﬁle. The IAB employment subsample is an anonymised
1% sample from the historic ﬁle. Details of the anonymisation procedure are described
in Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000). One eﬀect of the anonymisation procedure is the
top coding of the data. But the top coding aﬀects only a tiny proportion of the young
apprentices in our sample. Due to the fact that the information for East Germany is
only available for the time after uniﬁcation we use only the information of notiﬁcations
for people working in Western Germany. The employment subsample contains a total of
7,847,553 notiﬁcations with 6,711,153 notiﬁcations for Western Germany. On the basis
of the ﬁnal notiﬁcations in each case, the ﬁle provides information of 483,327 Western
Germans (Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000), p.2).
Apart from information in the historic ﬁle the IAB employment subsample contains
information from two other data sources. The beneﬁts recipients ﬁle contains person-
related information on periods in which the Federal Employment Service paid beneﬁts
like the status of the unemployed and the type of beneﬁt payments (unemployment
beneﬁt, unemployment assistance or maintenance payments for participating in training
or re-training programs). But not all spells of registered non-employment were covered
(Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000)). The second ﬁle which adds information to IAB
employment subsample is the establishment ﬁle. The ﬁle provides additional information
on the notifying establishment as the date of birth and death of the establishment as
well as generated information on the pattern of skill levels of employees within the
establishment.
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B.2 QaC data
We use the 1991/1992 Qualiﬁcations and Careers Survey (QaC) data of the Bundesinsti-
tut fuer Berufsbildung (BiBB) and the Institut fuer Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
(IAB). This data set asks a random sample of the working population (excluding persons
currently enrolled in an apprenticeship, people on military or civil service, and helping
family members) about their qualiﬁcation, job career, workplace conditions, job satis-
faction as well as activities in formal and informal education. Similar surveys exit for
the years 1979 and 1985/86, but all surveys are cross-sections. The data set collects in
total information on 34277 individuals - 24090 for West Germany and 10187 for East
Germany. We choose a sub-sample of male employees residing in West Germany, with-
out an academic degree, who completed an apprenticeship, which lasts longer than 24
months. In addition we restrict our focus on employees younger the 35 years of age.
45
References
Acemoglu, D., and J.-S. Pischke (1998): “Why Do Firms Train? Theory and
Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 79–119.
Angrist, J. D., and A. B. Krueger (1991): “Does Compulsory Schooling Aﬀect
Schooling and Earnings?,” Quartlerly Journal of Economics, 106, 979–1014.
Baily, N. M., G. Burtless, and R. Litan (1992): Growth with Equity: Economic
Policymaking for the Next Century. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
Bassi, L. J., and J. Ludwig (2000): “School-to-Work Programs in the United States:
A Multi-Firm Case Study of Training, Beneﬁts and Costs,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 53(2), 219–239.
Becker, G. S. (1993): Human Capital. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3rd edn.
Bender, S., C. Dustmann, D. Margolis, and C. Meghir (1999): “Worker Dis-
placement in France and Germany,” The Institute for Fiscal Studies: Working Paper
Series: No. W99/14.
Bender, S., A. Haas, and C. Klose (2000): “IAB Employment Subsample 1975-
1995: Opportunities for Analysis Provided by the Anonymised Subsample,” IZA Dis-
cussion Paper No. 117.
Burtless, G. (1994): “Comment on Heckman et al, ”US Education and Training
Policy: A Re-Evaluatio of the Underlying Assumptions Behind the New Consensus’”,”
in Labor Markets, Employment Policy, and Job Creation, ed. by L. C. Solomon, and
A. R. Levenson, pp. 123–139. Milken Institute Series in Economics and Education.
Boulder and London: Westview Press in cooperation with the Milken Institute for
Job and Capital Formation.
Card, D. (1999): “The Causal Eﬀect of Education on Earnings,” in Handbook of
Labour Economics Volume 3A, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card. Elsevier, Amster-
dam.
Casey, B. (1991): “Recent Developments in the German Apprenticeship System,”
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(2), 205–222.
Chang, C., and Y. Wang (1996): “Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric
Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited,” Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3),
505–519.
Cramer, U. (1985): “Probleme der Genauigkeit der Beschaftigtenstatistik,”
Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 69, 56–68.
Dustmann, C., and C. Meghir (1999): “Wages, Experience and Seniority,” Institi-
tute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) Working Paper 99/1.
46
Federal Ministry of Education and Science (1992): Vocational Training in the
Dual System in the Federal Republic of GermanyFederal Ministry of Education and
Science, Bonn.
Harhoff, D., and T. J. Kane (1993): “Financing Apprenticeship Training: Evidence
from Germany,” NBER Working Paper No. 4557.
(1997): “Is the German Apprenticeship System a Panacea for the US Labour
Market?,” Journal of Population Economics, 10, 171–196.
Heckman, J. J. (1999): “Doing It Right: Job Training and Education,” The Public
Interest, Spring, 86–107.
Heckman, J. J., R. L. Roselius, and J. A. Smith (1994): “”U.S. Education and
Training Policy: A Re-Evaluation of the Underlying Assumptions Behind the ’New
Consensus.’”,” in Labor Markets, Employment Policy, and Job Creation., ed. by L. C.
Solmon, and A. R. Levenson, pp. 83–121. Milkin Institute Series in Economics and
Education. Boulder and London: Westview Press in cooperation with the Milken
Institute for Job and Capital Formation.
Hughes, K. L., T. R. Bailey, and M. J. Mechur (2001): “School-to-Work: Making
a Diﬀerence in Education: A Research Report to America,” Institute on Education
and the Economy, Teachers College, Columbia University.
Krueger, A., and C. Rouse (1998): “The Eﬀect of Workplace Education on Earnings,
Turnover, and Job Performance,” Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), 61–94.
Lynch, L. M. (1992): “Private Sector Training and the Earnings of Young Workers,”
American Economic Review, 82(1), 299–312.
Malcomson, J. M., J. W. Maw, and B. McCormick (2000): “General Training
by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy,” Working Paper, University of
Southampton.
McCall, B. P. (1990): “Occupational Matching: A Test of Sorts,” The Journal of
Political Economy, 98(1), 45–69.
Miller, R. (1984): “Job Matching and Occupational Choice,” The Journal of Political
Economy, 92(6), 1086–1120.
Mood, A. M., F. A. Graybill, and D. C. Boes (1974): Introduction to the Theory
of Statistics. McGraw-Hill, Auckland.
Mortensen, D. (1986): “Job Search and Labour Market Analysis,” in Handbook of
Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and R. Layard, pp. 849–919. Elsevier Science
Publishers BV.
Neal, D. (1995): “Industry-Speciﬁc Human Capital: Evidence from a Sample of Dis-
placed Workers,” Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4), 237–261.
47
(1999): “The Complexity of Job Mobility Amongst Young Men,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 17(2), 237–161.
Ryan, P. (2001): “The School-to-Work Transition: A Cross-National Perspective,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 39(1), 34–92.
Scoones, D. (2000): “Matching and Competition for Human Capital,” Labour
Economics, 7, 135–152.
Steedman, H. (1993): “The Economics of Youth Training in Germany,” The Economic
Journal, 103(420), 1279–1291.
Steedman, H., A. Green, O. Betrand, A. Richter, M. Rubin, and K. Weber
(1997): “Assessment, Qualiﬁcations and Standards: The UK Compared to France,
Germany, Singapore and the US,” London.
Steedman, H., F. Green, and P. Ryan (1998): “Apprenticeship - a Strategy for
Growth,” London.
Stevens, M. (1994): “A Theoretical Model of on-the-Job Training with Imperfect
Competition,” Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 537–562.
Topel, R. H., and M. P. Ward (1992): “Job Mobility and the Careers of Young
Men,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 439–479.
Werwatz, A. (1998): “Mobility After Apprenticeship - How Eﬀective is German
Apprenticeship Training?,” SFB 373 Discussion Paper 97-55, Humboldt University,
Berlin.
Winkelmann, R. (1994): “Training, Earnings Mobility and Skill Acquisition,” CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 982.
48
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers  
 
        
517 J. Blanden 
A. Goodman 
P. Gregg 
S. Machin 
 
Change in Intergenerational Mobility in Britain 
516 A. Chevalier 
T. K. Viitanen 
The Long-Run Labour Market Consequences of Teenage 
Motherhood in Britain 
 
515 A. Bryson 
R. Gomez 
M. Gunderson 
N. Meltz 
 
Youth Adult Differences in the Demand for Unionisation:  
Are American, British and Canadian Workers That 
Different? 
514 A. Manning Monopsony and the Efficiency of Labor Market 
Interventions 
 
513 H. Steedman Benchmarking Apprenticeship:  UK and Continental 
Europe Compared 
 
512 R. Gomez 
M. Gunderson 
N. Meltz 
 
From ‘Playstations’ to ‘Workstations’:  Youth Preferences 
for Unionisation 
511 G. Duranton 
D. Puga 
 
From Sectoral to Functional Urban Specialisation 
510 P.-P. Combes 
G. Duranton 
 
Labor Pooling, Labour Poaching, and Spatial Clustering 
509 R. Griffith 
S. Redding 
J. Van Reenen 
 
Measuring the Cost Effectiveness of an R&D Tax Credit 
for the UK 
508 H. G. Overman 
S. Redding 
A. J. Venables 
 
The Economic Geography of Trade, Production and 
Income:  A Survey of Empirics 
507 A. J. Venables Geography and International Inequalities:  the Impact of 
New Technologies 
 
506 R. Dickens 
D. T. Ellwood 
 
Whither Poverty in Great Britain and the United States?  
The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work 
Will Work 
 
505 M. Ghell Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of 
Unemployment 
 
504 A. Charlwood Influences on Trade Union Organising Effectiveness in 
Great Britain 
 
503 D. Marsden 
S. French 
K. Kubo 
 
Does Performance Pay De-Motivate, and Does It Matter? 
502 S. Nickell 
L. Nunziata 
W. Ochel 
G. Quintini 
 
The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages in the 
OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s 
501 S. Redding 
M. Vera-Martin 
 
Factor Endowments and Production in European Regions 
500 Edited by 
D. Marsden and  
H. Stephenson 
Labour Law and Social Insurance in the New Economy:  A 
Debate on the Supiot Report 
   
499 A. Manning A Generalised Model of Monopsony 
   
498 A. Charlwood Why Do Non-Union Employees Want to Unionise?  
Evidence from Britain 
   
497 M. Keil 
D. Robertson 
J. Symons 
 
Minimum Wages and Employment 
496 A. Di Liberto 
J. Symons 
 
Education and Italian Regional Development 
495 S. Redding 
A. J. Venables 
 
Economic Geography and International Inequality 
494 A. Bryson Union Effects on Managerial and Employee Perceptions of 
Employee Relations in Britain 
 
493 D. Metcalf British Unions:  Dissolution or Resurgence Revisited 
 
 
To order a discussion paper, please contact the Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
